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By way of an Introduction:  These pages contain individual chapters from my 
1990 book, Postmodern Sophistications. I have obtained the rights to the essays am 
making them available separately. The entire text of the book is also available on 
Research Gate.  
The underlying aim of this collection of essays was to question the opposition 
between the Sophists and Plato. That classic dispute has been the model for many 
discussions of tensions within our society:: on the one hand you have the clever 
manipulative salesmen who care nothing about truth. On the other hand the 
rigorous scientific investigation that never quite makes contact with politics. 
Rootless nihilism vs. naturally grounded values. Anarchy vs. Rules. 
These essays developed a pragmatic middleground, using ideas from 
Heidegger and Dewey; in later writings I rely more on Hegel. But the point remains 
the same: don't listen to the Straussians and others who try to force our thinking (or 
our politics or art or philosophy)into a blunt opposition between truth-loving 
traditionalists (Socrates) and flaky relativistic postmoderns (the Sophists). It was not 
so simple in Greece and it's not so simple today. 
Part of the book deals with postmodern critiques of rational knowledge, with 
Lyotard and Habermas on center stage. Their opposition remains relevant, although 
post-1990 developments in deconstruction and critical theory have widened and 
deepened the debate. The points made in these essays remain useful, if not 
complete. 
The second part of the book deals with architecture, where modern and 
postmodern staged a public standoff. The word postmodern has now gone out of 
fashion in architecture. But the earlier use of the term still applies to the attempt to 
weave historical references back into architectural practices that had been taught to 
seek formal purity. .   
I stand by my diagnosis of postmodern architecture as just another modern 
distance from history, and my argument that that modern architecture's proclaimed 
distance from history was itself an illusion. We are more embedded in history than 
the moderns wanted to think, although that embodiment is not as total and 
restrictive as they imagined for our ancestors. 
If you find any of these ideas useful, true, provocative, let me know. If you 
find them absurd or useless airy nothings, I'd still be delighted to learn from your 
reactions. 
David Kolb, January 2018
Charles A. Dana Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, Bates College
davkolb@gmail.com, www.dkolb.org, mobile 547 868 4713
This second chapter asks about certitude, truth, and method in the Greeks.
Chapter 2. The Last Word in Greek Philosophy 
To replace the interminable old myths but avoid the premature closure offered by the 
Sophists, Plato sought a method which would find the guaranteed last word. What does it 
mean to have the last word, to settle a debate? On the modern view debates are settled by 
experts. Debates can be ended by force or influence; a rhetorician, or a charismatic 
leader, or a soldier can stop people from talking, for a while. But it takes an expert to settle 
a debate, to pin it down so it cannot float any more. 
The scientist is our model expert who has the facts and the proofs. The experts join 
together to produce the total last word, Unified Science. All the facts, and all the laws for 
each region of facts, and all expressible in one basic language: it is with this that Descartes 
suggests we can become "the masters and possessors of the earth." This word will deflate 
illusions, settle debates, and give a basis for our actions and plans. If we want to rebuild 
our city (an image both Plato and Descartes favor) we are told we would do well to put 
our decisions on such a firm foundation. 
This picture of the last word has been under scrutiny lately. We are not so confident 
of it as we used to be. In this chapter I want to look back at the Greeks who are supposed 
to have inflicted this metaphysical notion of the last word upon us. I will argue that the 
practice of the Greek philosophers was more flexible than the reports of their theories 
would have us believe. Maybe our own practice is or could be more flexible as well. 
Aristotle 
I turn first to Aristotle. The way he describes the last word can look similar to our 
own. He speaks of sciences that concern different kinds of beings, coordinated by a basic 
metaphysical system into something like a total map of reality. But this resemblance to 
modern ideals is not as close as it seems. First, Aristotle's sciences do not give all the facts. 
Most facts are what he would call "accidental": the color of your hair, the weight of this 
book. Aristotle believes there can be no science of the accidental fact; science studies the 
essences of things to find principles that are necessary and unchanging. Aristotle is not 
interested in the color of your hair except in so far as it might indicate something about 
being human, or colored, or hair in general. So Aristotle's "map of reality" leaves out much 
that would interest us. 
Also, his map works differently. The various sciences he sponsors do not connect 
directly. When we draw a map we expect regions to be contiguous, but for Aristotle the 
regions are not even on the same plane. The principles of one Aristotelian science are not 
derivable from those of another. Two of his sciences might discuss the same being, as the 
cow in the field can be studied as an animal in biology or as a changing being in what 
Aristotle calls physics, the general science of changeable things. But these two ways of 
studying the cow do not reduce to one basic treatment. There is no one language that will 
tell us all we need to know about the cow; Aristotle is not a reductionist. The principles of 
physics need to be amplified and specified in order to tell us about the cow as an animal. 
On the other hand, biology does not tell us how to find the more general principles of 
physics. Moderns presuppose that the last word will be delivered in one unified language. 
Aristotle's sciences speak a bundle of languages with analogies between them. 
There is no one vocabulary for writing a report on all the facts. 
Aristotle does have metaphysics. That highest science does talk about all that exists 
using the same principles concerning matter and form, actuality and potentiality, 
substance and the four causes. A cow, a poem, a man can all be discussed using this 
vocabulary. But on this level Aristotle has left aside what makes them different. 
Metaphysics is not a summary but an abstraction; a poem and a cow are not potential and 
actual in the same way. Nor does Aristotle provide us with a basic set of entities and 
relations that are to underlie everything. At most he gives us the prime examples of what it 
means to be, but to be a prime example is not to be basic in the way that electrons and 
photons are basic for us. 
We want to understand things by reducing them to a realm of basic entities described 
in a basic language. Aristotle has a different project. We try to understand by discerning 
identical formal structure through a variety of instances. Aristotle does not do that, either, 
though his teacher Plato did. Aristotle finds analogous structures that are not purely formal 
and are not true of everything in precisely the same way. 
The modern total last word would contain a continuous report in a univocal 
language that to us all the truth. A real being would be one that showed up in that final 
report. Aristotle takes whatever beings come to presence naturally and finds ways to talk 
about them in relation to first principles that operate analogously (that is, both the same 
and differently) in each region. He tells us how a poem embodies these principles, and 
how a cow does. He is not so much writing a systematic report on everything true as he is 
bringing each kind of thing into the nearness of those first principles. 
When he is explaining his methods Aristotle tells us that knowledge should be 
expressed in chains of syllogistic arguments. But his most important works have quite 
another form. They contain arguments, but the arguments are found within a shifting 
discourse that clarifies the concepts and leads us to the first principles. This is not just an 
expository convenience; we need this shifting discourse, itself without a firm structure of 
first principles. The shifting discourse locates the science amid its alternatives, gives it a 
bearing on our life, justifies our acceptance of its principles. The shifting discourse 
provides a medium in which we can come near to the first principles. 
Aristotle does not see his scientific last word, such as it is, as settling our practical 
debates. For that we go to the man of practical wisdom who is good at making prudential 
decisions. The man of practical wisdom does not possess a special scientific knowledge. 
He cannot work from a special science because for Aristotle all sciences concern the 
necessary and essential features of things, about which no one deliberates or makes 
choices. 
This separation of science from practical decision may sound familiar to us. Our 
standard modern picture has science setting forth an acknowledged public set of facts that 
provide a framework within which private interests and chosen values battle for policy 
influence. But Aristotle's separation is almost exactly the reverse of ours. What is private, 
for him, is scientific knowledge, which is possessed by an elite who have the leisure to 
study. What forms the public space of discussion is not scientific reporting but shared 
deliberation and concern for the common good. 
Plato 
Turning from Aristotle to Plato may seem to bring us closer to the modern view. I 
claimed above that the analogous unity of Aristotle's sciences made his last word different 
from the standard modern one-level picture. Aristotle criticizes Plato for lacking a sense of 
analogy and trying to meld everything into one science with a mathematical basis. It 
sounds as if Plato fits better our standard picture. When we consider the ferocious 
education Plato suggests for his philosopher kings we may think Plato has put it all 
together in the modern mold: scientific politicians using the last word in knowledge to rule 
wisely. 
This picture is half mistaken. The philosopher kings' education is not all that 
encyclopedic. Their studies emphasize skills, not factual content (Republic 521d). Plato 
tells us (503e) that they must learn to abstract and contemplate, to move from becoming to 
being. They are taught to discern the necessary laws about the natures of things. 
Astronomy is useful for the calendar, but mostly is a vehicle for higher mathematics 
beyond what has practical value in commerce and military matters. Nor do the apprentice 
rulers study much theory about society beyond knowing its essential structures and 
divisions. They do not have a descriptive social science. What they do learn, in long years 
of apprentice administration, is how to apply general principles to particular cases. They 
learn, that is, to exercise prudence and practical wisdom. 
Once they are trained they spend their time not in endless Socratic discussion but in 
administration. They make decisions about the size of the grain crop, the military situation, 
and who should marry whom. Their education helps them to decide not because they 
have some modern report on all the facts but because they have learned to see in each 
situation the matters that need measure, and to approach the forms that are the sources of 
harmonious measure. 
If the work of the philosopher kings were merely to define the virtues and set up a 
general constitution, one Platonic Solon would suffice. If the forms were not relevant to 
daily decisions then at most an oversight group of philosophers would be needed to keep 
an eye on the general trend of events. In Plato's Laws the Nocturnal Council functions just 
that way, for in the city of the Laws philosophy is not involved in everyday decisions. But 
in the city of the Republic the philosopher kings attend to details. They do so not by 
consulting some cosmic encyclopedia but by taking the matters at hand into the nearness 
of the first principles, the forms that measure all things. This is the last word for Plato. 
While there is a systematic interrelation to the realm of the forms, the use of this 
science is more occasional than systematic. Commentators who have wondered whether 
Platonic practical science would be a deductive ethics have missed the point. There was to 
be no finished dialectic. There was to be no book that said it all. We cannot underestimate 
this difference from our own standard ideals. Platonic practical science was not frozen and 
presented all at once; it was the perpetual activity of relating changing things to ever better 
understood first principles. 
None of Plato's proposed cities were real, but his Academy was. Imagine the 
Academy at work: groups would be investigating regions of being, say geometry and 
biology, seeking their necessary principles. There would also be general conversation 
about the highest forms and common characteristics of all things (being, unity, goodness, 
sameness, difference, and so on). Members would try to relate the regions they were 
studying to those core principles. But this sounds suspiciously like Aristotle's picture of the 
sciences. Where the Platonic enterprise differs is in a greater emphasis on methods of 
conceptual division and on the goal of deriving the principles of the various regions from 
the core forms by some quasi- mathematical process. This goal might have led to a 
rationalist total science, but it remained only a background hope. 
So the general Academic activity was not the development of a modern system of the 
world but a movement from particular regions to the core principles and then back to a 
purified version of the region under study. There seems to have been little attempt to 
devise one language for reporting a total picture. Indeed the one work of Plato's that most 
closely approaches our ideal of a total picture, the Timaeus, is expressly denied the status 
of scientific knowledge. 
The Sophists 
Plato's unified science was to show forth the necessary connections among the forms 
that defined the essence of reality. Matters at hand would have been brought near the 
explored forms for illumination and measurement. Decisions could then be made on how 
to achieve a moving harmony that imaged the unity of the forms. Aristotle objected to the 
tight unity of Plato's central knowledge, and he denied the practical efficacy of 
approaching the forms to seek measures. Exploring the essences of things afforded for 
Aristotle the highest intellectual satisfaction, but no practical guidance. 
Understanding the reasons why Plato and Aristotle differed on the practical impact of 
the speculative last word takes us into Greek culture. There are philosophical reasons, to 
be sure, having to do with different conceptions of causality and of the relation of the 
universal to the particular. But I want to emphasize a social reason for the disagreement 
between Plato and Aristotle, because it brings to light a problem about last words. 
I deliberately described the Platonic scientist in a way which makes him (or her!) 
sound like someone consulting an oracle. Take your problem into the nearness of the 
highest, and emerge bearing an answer. Behind the Platonic scientist lie Empedocles, the 
poem of Parmenides, and a line of seers approaching the archaic origins. In our world we 
worry about the tension between the politician and the scientist. Before that came the 
tension between the king and the prophet, the tribal leader and the shaman, Oedipus and 
Tiresias. Tiresias, near to the origins, possesses dark wisdom and pronounces last words. 
Oedipus, the man of deeds, is qualified by past experience to deal with present problems. 
The uneasy interaction between these two breaks down about the time of Socrates. 
We might see this as a collapse of traditional modes of legitimation of both oracles and 
leaders. New sources of power are discovered in trade and the economy, and in the new 
instrument of rhetoric. Plato describes "a little bald-headed tinker who has made money 
and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got 
himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master's daughter who has fallen 
into poverty and abandonment" (Republic 465e). The nouveaux riches are pushing out the 
old clansmen; the old sources of power are being undermined. 
With the advent of money and sophistry anyone could have power, anyone could 
have the last word. No longer could one be sure the leader was near to the gods. Plato 
grew up amid this change. He sought for a new legitimation, a guaranteed last word that 
could not be bought. This word would not be guaranteed in the old way, from its source in 
some special person. It would be guaranteed because it was anonymous, because it came 
from no one in particular and was available to anyone willing to undertake the discipline 
of approaching the forms that were the true origins of things. The philosopher king was not 
to speak from personal charisma or persuasive skill, but from a source independent of his 
or anyone's particular desires. That word would be spoken and received out of a desire 
deeper than our idiosyncratic loves, from a level where we are and seek the same. 
To make this possible Plato had to beat out the Sophists. But he also had to remove 
Tiresias; there can be no unique person whose mystic anointing brings him near to the 
dark heart of reality. One move will banish both the Sophists and Tiresias. To put it 
mythically: in Homer, Zeus has the last word; he ends the disputes among the gods. But 
behind him are the Fates, shadowy presences who spin and weave and cut--but they do 
not speak. Theirs is the last move, but they have no word. An opaqueness clouds the 
origins of things. 
Compare this with the tenth book of Plato's Laws, which decrees harsh opposition to 
Democritus and others who would affirm ultimate opacity. Plato makes the archaic origins 
available to speaking. It may be difficult, he says, but it is possible to see and to say. This 
provides a last word that is neither yours nor mine. Thus there is no room for the Sophists, 
since the sayable forms will banish relativism and scheming. Nor is there any room for 
Tiresias; if there is mysticism in Plato it is not of the dark. 
Plato's philosopher kings were to bring this word to bear as a measure for life. 
Aristotle agrees that the origins of things can be seen and spoken, but he does not claim 
that they can define our practice. His man of practical wisdom does not have a word but a 
skill, a virtue, almost the knack that Plato feared in the Sophists. 
Why does Aristotle not fear the Sophists? Plato saw in them symptoms of our deep 
weakness, our ability to put a false image in place of the truth and hide from ourselves 
even the need for a question. Aristotle seems to find them faintly amusing specimens to be 
botanized for mistakes and tricks in arguments. Is it only that Aristotle, being younger and 
not an Athenian, had not experienced the tragedies that unbridled rhetoric brought on 
Athens during the Peloponnesian war? Or was it that society had changed in the 
intervening years and the Sophists were no longer serious professional rivals to the 
philosophers? 
Perhaps both of these are true, but I think there is a deeper reason that points to a 
flaw in the Platonic program for scientific politics. Plato's hope for an effective last word 
demands that people be converted. Socrates gave his life trying to make people stop and 
think and talk. If they could be brought to see that their own words lacked foundation they 
might find that their desire for wholeness drove them to join the search for the origins of 
things. Since "it is impossible that a multitude be philosophical," people must be pulled 
out of the multitude's shared certainty. But Socrates cannot talk to every one by one to 
dissolve the multitude and reconstitute it as a community joined in the Socratic quest. This 
impossibility reduced Plato to the dream of catching the multitude before it formed, 
banishing adults and raising the children to philosophy. 
The last word remains politically impotent. Plato's adventures in Syracuse show that 
the philosophers' group can only appear as one more cabal. Plato wrote the Laws for this 
real world where wisdom can be at most the goal of a small elite and the ruler's main 
qualification must be prudence, not philosophy. What we know of the political activities 
carried on by the Academy fits this pattern. 
This leaves Plato's project turning in the shifting discourse that seeks origins, with 
elite groups pursuing various incomplete sciences that relate only partially to one another, 
and with practical decisions left to prudence and a purified rhetoric. This leaves Plato, in 
short, with Aristotle. 
Perhaps not quite. In Plato what I have called the shifting discourse stands out more 
strongly than in Aristotle. Though his ideals for scientific achievement are more grandiose, 
Plato's text is less sure than Aristotle's. I do not mean the textual descriptions of the ideal, 
but the actual wandering dialogues, a discourse without fixed starting points or first 
principles. While the dialogues announce beginnings and origins, they themselves do not 
stand firm. Any fixed position must be arrived at through the shifting discourse; we start 
nowhere special except where we are. That discourse had its own drive; it pushes people 
around; yet it obeys no fixed rules, refusing to be methodical or literal in its pursuit of 
literal method. It is not a partial science, yet it surrounds and renders accessible even the 
hope of science. In its own way it has the last word. 
Perhaps it still does. Modernity seeks the total uniform system; the Greeks did 
otherwise, even though they are our ancestors. Modernity wanted universal theory to 
illuminate private choices; Aristotle wanted shared choices to culminate in a life of private 
theory. But modern total science is not our last word any more, if it ever really was. We, 
perhaps postmodern, are caught in the shifting discourse, building without firm starting 
points and with no sure direction in which to seek the origins that slip away from us. 
Perhaps everyone has always been in the shifting discourse, whatever else they have said. 
  
